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Article
The Logical Next Step:
Motivations on the Formation of a Business and
Human Rights Treaty
Graham Markiewicz
I. INTRODUCTION
The human rights movement has been hailed as humanity’s
last utopia. The ideals it espouses are powerful enough to bring
millions out of poverty, advance equality in the face of diversity,
and create more free and fair societies across the globe. In
practice, however, human rights are often used as a tool by the
powerful to the very detriment of those who should be helped by
them.1 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen of 1789, one of the foundational documents of human
rights thought, both lifted up individuals, protecting their
rights,2 and helped to dismantle empires. Ho Chi Minh, for
example, quoted the Declaration to rally support for Vietnamese
independence from France.3 He later used this independence to
establish an autocratic communist state in Vietnam.4
Julius Nyerere, who instituted a security state5 in Tanzania
and brought millions to the brink of starvation, said:

Currently serving as a Legislative Assistant in the United States House
of Representatives; J.D. Boston College Law School, 2016; B.S. United States
Military Academy at West Point, 2008. The author would like to thank
Professors Michael Cassidy and Cees van Dam for their mentorship, guidance
and support.
1. See generally Kenneth Cmiel, Human Rights, Freedom of Information,
and the Origins of Third-World Solidarity, in TRUTH CLAIMS: REPRESENTATION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (Mark Phillip Bradley & Patrice Petro eds., 2002).
2. See Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens (Fr. 1789).
3. Cmiel, supra note 1, at 110.
4. See Ho Chi Minh, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/vietnamwar/ho-chi-minh (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
5. See Michael Kaufman, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania Dies; Preached
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Are [Africans] going to turn round them, tomorrow after
we have achieved Independence and say, “To hell with all
this nonsense about human rights; we are only using
that as a tactic to harness the sympathy of the naive?”
Human nature is sometimes depraved I know, but I don’t
believe it is depraved to that extent. I don’t believe that
the leaders of a people are going to behave as hypocrites
to gain their ends, and then turn round and do exactly
the things which they have been fighting against.6

Such uses of human rights rhetoric diminish its importance and
makes accomplishing progress less likely. Using rights as a tool
to establish other ends forces them to become platitudes and
caused Professor Hersch Lauterpacht to critically denounce “the
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] as a humbling defeat
of the ideals it grandly proclaimed.”7 Therefore, while human
rights have the capability to be a refuge for humanity, the
motivations behind them must also be examined. Without due
diligence in examining motivations and intended policies,
human rights can, counter-intuitively, be harmful.
Despite a sinister history of abuse, the global human rights
campaign continues to advance. In 2011 the United Nations
published the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (“UNGP”).8 This soft-law document provided a
framework for multinational corporations (“MNC”)9 and other
African Socialism to the World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/world/julius-nyerere-of-tanzania-diespreached-african-socialism-to-the-world.html?_r=0 (detailing that as President,
Nyerere gave sweeping powers to the military which in turn enforced heavy
taxes, collectivization, and nationalized industry).
6. Andreas Eckert, African Nationalists and Human Rights, 1940s-1970s,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 283, 298 (Stefan-Ludwig
Hoffmann ed., 2011).
7. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights in History, THE NATION (Aug. 30/Sept. 6
2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/human-rights-history/.
8. John Ruggie, Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
9. An MNC, also referred to as a Transnational Corporation (“TNC”), is a
large, typically Western business operating in foreign countries, usually early
in the supply chain, such as material sourcing or manufacturing. See Anita
Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 91 n.3 (2002); see also
Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for
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non-state actors to interact with and support human rights
globally. Following the passage of the UNGP, the next logical
step is for the adoption of a legally binding instrument that
would hold multinational corporations accountable for human
rights violations they are involved with regardless of the
jurisdiction. Strangely, as discussed below, proponents of a
Business and Human Rights (“BHR”) treaty are some of the
worst human rights violators, while those who would ostensibly
have the most to gain from this treaty are against it.
This Article examines the motives behind positions for and
against the idea of a BHR treaty. It attempts to discover what a
binding instrument would mean for state signatories and why
they may or may not support such a treaty. It first examines the
processes leading to the UNGP and looks at corporate
accountability in context. Next, it determines key players and
allocates them across the divide for and against the treaty
movement. The core of this Article analyzes motivations behind
each side’s treaty stance, with a focus on those reasons aside
from a desire to respect human rights. These motivations
include how a binding treaty and its drafting processes itself
affect national bargaining power and reputational risks. Further
motivations are increasingly underhanded; they include the
desire to obfuscate, distract from human rights discourse, and
shift blame away from state actors. Additionally, this Article
explores how a binding instrument can counterintuitively offer
more flexibility than a broad, encompassing voluntary one, and
allows the reader to draw his or her own conclusion as to
whether, in the face of these motivations, the path towards a
BHR treaty can still lead to a net positive gain for human rights
principles.
II. ANALYSIS
A. HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE
Holding corporations to account for complicity in human
rights crimes goes at least as far back at the Nuremburg trials
post World War II.10 Corporations in Germany benefited greatly
from the forced labor and other human rights atrocities of the
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 749 (1970). This might be done
through subsidiaries in a process that is not always transparent.
10. Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 104.
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oppressive Nazi regime.11 The United States Military Tribunal
tried directors from three German companies, and found them
culpable for plunder, slavery, and mass murder.12 These trials
held corporate leadership as accountable for the actions of their
businesses as it found politicians accountable for the actions of
the state. One of the most famous cases from these trials was
that of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, CEO of the
Krupp Holding.13 His firm was found to have exploited forced
labor from Nazi concentration camps among other human rights
cruelties.14 In his defense, Alfried Krupp stated that “[w]e
Krupps never cared much for [political] ideas. We only wanted a
system that worked well and allowed us to work unhindered.
Politics is not our business.”15 Despite the adage nullum crimen
sine lege,16 the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach trial
shows that corporations and their directors cannot ignore basic
human decency.17
In 1972, the UN formed a “Group of Eminent Persons” to
look further into moral issues and regulations of transnational
corporations.18 This group was extremely controversial, yet it
helped lead to the creation of the United Nations Center on
Transnational Corporations (“UNCTC”), which took the lead on
developing a code of conduct for transnational corporations.19
This group was embroiled in antipathy between developing
socialist countries and more developed economies.20 The
ideological debate was built on fundamental differences of
interest: low-income countries wanted to increase foreign
investment, while developed countries aimed to protect domestic
11. Id.
12. Id. at 105–06.
13. Anti-Defamation League, Nuremberg Trials 60th Anniversary: The
Krupp Trial, DIMENSIONS: A JOURNAL OF HOLOCAUST STUDIES (Fall 2006),
http://archive.adl.org/education/dimensions_19/section3/krupp.html#.VgMmC7
T5pUQ (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
14. Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 111.
15. Anti-Defamation League, supra note 13.
16. “No crime without a law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
17. See Devin Pendas, Law, Not Vengeance, in TRUTH CLAIMS:
REPRESENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 26 (Mark Phillip Bradley & Patrice
Petro eds., 2002).
18. Theodore H. Moran, The United Nations and Transnational
Corporations: A Review and a Perspective, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 18 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 91, 92 (2009).
19. TAGI SAGAFI-NEJAD, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
FROM CODE OF CONDUCT TO GLOBAL COMPACT, 89–97 (2008).
20. Moran, supra note 18, at 92.
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enterprises.21 It received further criticism for exacerbating
economic disparities and operating inefficiently, approaching
corruption.22 Following more than 20 years of little or no
progress, the UNCTC was disbanded as a spectacular failure.23
Later, in 1999, then-Secretary General of the UN, Kofi
Annan, announced the Global Compact, a set of aspirational
voluntary norms to which businesses could pledge.24 This
attempt by the United Nations joined a variety of other
independent frameworks, including the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), civil society
recommendations, and internal corporate codes of conduct.25 By
some accounts, the Global Compact was wildly successful: in less
than ten years, over 4,700 businesses had signed on.26 Although
this seems impressive at first, the number of businesses to join
comprise less than 7 percent of the 75,000 transnational
corporations.27 Thus, while cultural views were changing, the
United Nations was doing too little, and too slowly, to ensure
corporate accountability. Yet, the stage was set for the next step
in formalizing corporate social responsibility.
Eventually, in 2011, the UN ratified the Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights.28 The UNGP are considered
“soft law,” meaning that they are not binding on any member
state; rather, they attempt to show a set of best practices for
businesses to follow, under the understanding that “companies

21. Karl Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct
on Transnational Corporations: Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 11, 20–23 (2015). Note that these interests are not a zero-sum,
yet inability to compromise eventually led to no movement on these issues.
22. See, e.g., JULIANA GERAN, THE CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: HOW THE U.N. INJURES POOR NATIONS (1987).
23. See LOUIS EMMERIJ & RICHARD JOLLY, U.N. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
PROJECT, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BRIEFING NOTE
NUMBER 17 2 (2009) (explaining that though the UNCTC made significant
contributions in documenting the activities of transnational corporations, it was
dismantled in the face of changing UN goals from designing codes of conduct to
“inviting” transnational corporations to “join a global compact to further the
common good.”).
24. Carolin F Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065, 1066 (2003).
25. Id.
26. Moran, supra note 18, at 105.
27. Hillemanns, supra note 24, at 1069.
28. Ruggie, supra note 8, at 3–5.
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do not succeed in societies which fail.”29 These Principles
acknowledge the state duty to protect human rights and
additionally expose a corollary duty among corporations.30
Functionally, the UNGP have encouraged states to develop a
mutually-beneficial team relationship with corporations to
ensure all stakeholders respect human rights. In 2014, the
Human Rights Council at the UN pushed member states to
create their own National Action Plans (“NAP”s) to implement
the UNGP within their own territory.31 Though the Group of
Eminent Persons has made significant progress, it is too soon to
tell what its legacy will be. The logical next step, however, is to
codify these principles into a binding resolution for all UN
member states to ratify and enforce within their borders. An
international BHR Treaty is an admirable goal that could do
much to protect the rights of all people.
B. PROPONENTS OF THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY
The movement pushing for the creation of a BHR Treaty
presents us with a unique challenge: the examination of
principled dialogue versus political rhetoric. Ecuador, which
suffers from chronic human rights violations and state
constraints on freedoms, is a prime example of this challenge.
According to Amnesty International, Ecuador fails to protect the
rights of indigenous peoples, and continually attacks critics of
the government and human rights defenders.32 There are also
issues with arbitrary detention, torture, freedom of speech, and
gender equality.33
It is curious, then, that Ecuador led a coalition of nine
countries and the Arab and Africa Groups in 2013 calling for the
UNGP to be drafted into an international treaty.34 These
29. Kofi Annan, 7th Secretary-General of the U.N., Presentation at the
International Bar Association Showcase Session: Business and Human Rights
(Oct. 5, 2015) (video available at https://vimeo.com/141529821).
30. Ruggie, supra note 8, at 3.
31. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporation
and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1, at 2 (June 23, 2014).
32. Amnesty Int’l, State of the World’s Human Rights 2014/15, AI Index
POL 10/0012015, at 135 (Feb. 25, 2015).
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014: ECUADOR 2–5 (2014); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
ECUADOR 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1, 3, 11–12, 27–28 (2013).
34. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY ALLIANCE,
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countries issued a statement at the 24th Session of the Human
Rights Council that read: “A legally binding instrument would
provide the framework for enhanced State action to protect
rights and prevent the occurrence of violations.”35 Even Algeria,
a state that tried to administratively eliminate the Guiding
Principles, 36 is now pressing for the creation of a treaty.37 We
must therefore examine why countries such as these—in
addition to Cuba, Somalia, and Chad, all of which have received
the worst possible human rights scores38—are clamoring for the
passage of a human rights treaty.39 Perhaps, as some opponents
argue, the movement for a business and human rights treaty is
not about protecting human rights.
C. OPPONENTS TO THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY
A comprehensive study conducted by Oona Hathaway
tracked the status of human rights, covering over 45 years and
166 countries, to see if human rights treaties had had the desired
effect.40 Her study found that not one treaty had a positive effect
on human rights, and surprisingly, some actually made the
situation they governed worse.41 This sentiment is echoed by
Eric Posner, who states that “there is little evidence that human
rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the well-being of
people, or even resulted in respect for the rights in those
treaties.”42 Posner likewise takes a careful look at data collected
by Freedom House and determines that “[s]ome evidence

http://www.treatymovement.com/history (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
35. Statement on Behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24th Session of the
Human Rights Council (Sept. 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf.
36. JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS xlix (2013).
37. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, supra note 34.
38. Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores, 2015
Subcategory Scores, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report
/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores#.VSkGiLqJdUQ (last visited
Oct. 23, 2016).
39. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, supra note 34.
40. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
41. Id. at 1940.
42. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (Geoffrey R.
Stone ed., 2014).
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suggests that certain authoritarian regimes actually engaged in
more violations after ratifying human rights treaties.”43
With this counterintuitive phenomenon, perhaps it is
understandable why some of the most outspoken critics of a BHR
treaty include John Ruggie, drafter of the UNGP, 44 and powerful
modern countries which traditionally support advances in
human rights, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. These developed Western countries have a great deal
to lose in the treaty-creation process and eventual adoption of a
binding instrument. As described below, considerations of
bargaining power and political capital must be addressed. But
Western countries may also be taking a pragmatic approach,
opposing the BHR Treaty because of the negative effect it could
have on human rights.
D. BARGAINING POWER
As shown above, the human right of self-determination is a
strong bargaining chip. The human rights movement is
essentially one of equality, and thus may be viewed as a
rebalance of power. Although human rights are normatively
thought of as a Western device, they have gained support in
transitioning nations. Posner points out that “many treaties,
while heavily influenced by Western norms, were actually
initiated by groups in developing countries who hoped to
improve rights in those countries and sought outside support.”45
But again, one needs to examine the motive behind this shift to
understand if states are acting out of altruism or self-interest.
The double-edged sword of human rights can be used by lowincome states to gain power over more developed countries.
Part of this perverse incentive would be to use the treaty as
a way for developing governments to discriminate against
foreign MNCs. The current drafting of the BHR treaty would
only limit the behavior of large interstate corporations and
would not affect domestic companies.46 This would allow
43. Id. at 76.
44. Christen Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State
Approaches to Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 159, 176 (2008).
45. Posner, supra note 42, at 22.
46. Toby Webb, Business and Human Rights, Back on the UN Agenda,
SUSTAINABILITY = SMART BUSINESS (July 11, 2014), http://sustainablesmart
business.com/2014/07/business-and-human-rights-back-on-un/.
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domestic corporations to comply solely with local law and
continue to abuse human rights while foreign companies would
be hamstrung by comparison.47 A less pessimistic view within
this similar vein of reasoning is simply to state that this treaty
is but an attempt by developing governments to attain some
modicum of control over transnational corporations.48 One might
think that governments would have enough bargaining power to
contract MNC’s into a beneficial arrangement; however, many
developing countries are so desperate for Foreign Direct
Investment (“FDI”) that they often give such MNCs wide
latitude for operations.49 Professor Ruggie explains, “[s]tates
that host multinationals compete for foreign investment; home
states are concerned that their firms might lose out on
investment opportunities abroad to less scrupulous
competitors.”50 This could be understood to mean that
developing countries are attempting to level the playing field so
as to keep their local businesses competitive. However, there is
a clear concern that without corresponding local regulations, the
disadvantaged would trade one abuser for another.51
E. POLITICAL CAPITAL
Opposing the treaty movement are modern democracies like
the United States and the United Kingdom, both of whom likely
have more to lose from ratifying a BHR treaty. Ironically,
countries that already take measures to respect human rights
are not greatly inhibited by additional treaties. “So, in one sense
the human rights treaties do not require the developed countries
to do anything different from what they have done in the past.”52
If this is true, why, then, would states object to an instrument
which may not actually inhibit them? Professor Hathaway’s
research also shows that countries with a poor human rights

47. Id.
48. Scott Jerbi, Business and Human Rights at the UN: What Might
Happen Next?, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 299, 302 (2009).
49. Id. at 303.
50. Ruggie, supra note 36, at xxii.
51. See Doug Cassel, Treaty Process Gets Underway: Whoever Said It Would
Be Easy?, BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://businesshumanrights.org/en/treaty-process-gets-underway-whoever-said-it-would-beeasy (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
52. Posner, supra note 42, at 31.
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record are more likely to ratify human rights treaties because
they have less reputational capital to lose.53
Furthermore, under the UNGP system, countries and
corporations have the opportunity to choose to respect human
rights and be rewarded for it, while a treaty would force entities
into compliance and punish them for misbehavior.54 The
dichotomy of volunteerism to mandatory compliance could have
the negative effect of parties meeting just minimum guidelines.
Meanwhile, the benefit for state compliance comes more so from
signing the treaty rather than following its parameters. As
Hathaway explained: “[C]ountries are rewarded for positions [on
human rights] rather than [their] effects.”55
The United States’ standpoint is that the current
arrangement is more beneficial than a binding instrument.56
Any treaty would necessarily need to be narrow enough to win
broad support. This unfortunate consequence could actually
require states to do less for the human rights agenda than the
UNGP.57 The United States is not only boycotting the current
intergovernmental working group on a treaty, but it is urging
others to do the same.58 The United States Representative to the
UN Human Rights Council, Stephen Townley, explained: “[W]e
have not given states adequate time and space to implement the
Guiding Principles . . . this resolution is a threat to the Guiding
Principles themselves.”59 His statement expresses the fear that
a treaty path serves as a distraction to making effective changes
and finding workable solutions.60

53. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 2013.
54. Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging International Human Rights Norms for
Transnational Corporations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 279, 285 (2009).
55. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1941.
56. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve
Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 926 (2005).
57. Mantilla, supra note 54, at 295.
58. Carey Biron, Contentious Start for UN Process Toward Business and
Human Rights Treaty, MINT NEWS PRESS (July 10, 2014), http://www.mint
pressnews.com/contentious-start-u-n-process-toward-business-human-rightstreaty/193731.
59. Id.
60. JOLYON FORD, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS BRIDGING THE
GOVERNANCE GAP 23 (2015).
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F. BINDING NATURE OF THE INSTRUMENT
Although human rights discourse is predated by most
colonizing efforts, the great civilizing missions echo much of the
same ideas as modern human rights goals. As novelist F. Sionil
Jose poignantly said: “Colonialism subdues in many dulcet
guises. It conquered under the pretext of spreading Christianity,
civilization, law and order, to make the world safe for
democracy.”61 In addition to revolutionaries using human rights
to establish oppressive regimes, modern democracies may be
using human rights as a structure around which international
law is created and imposed on others. This use of human rights
begs one to question if human rights have now come to symbolize
what they had previously been used to destroy; more specifically,
are international human rights laws a form of neo-colonialism?
It must be noted that a business and human rights treaty is
in some ways cultural imperialism. The great debate in human
rights thought is universality of rights versus cultural
relativity.62 A BHR treaty could be an indirect way for the West
to put pressure on the developing world. If human rights are
universal, then one may argue that human rights are not
bounded by international law per se. Rather they are a law unto
themselves. Ruti Teitel asserts that “[b]y grounding the
protection of persons and people in the ‘association that binds
the human race,’ the ‘law of humanity’ gives persons and people
a legal and ethical status that is not entirely dependent on their
membership in a particular political community.”63 This is as
much as saying that there is a natural law that supersedes
61. F. Sionil Jose, Rosales and Pangasinan: Roots – Why They Matter, THE
PHILIPPINE STAR, http://www.philstar.com/arts-and-culture/2014/03/17/1301
139/rosales-and-pangasinan-roots-why-they-matter (last updated March 17,
2014).
62. Professor Haque explains it thus: “[H]uman rights are not granted
either by state or law; rather such rights are intrinsic in humanity. Every
individual is born with the same rights, making human rights absolute for all
human beings.” Ehsanul Haque, Universal Human rights and Cultural
Relativity: Conflict or Reconciliation?, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 22 (Kyriaki Topidi & Lauren Fielder eds., 2013). While
Professor Napoleon believes that “universal norms” should not be universally
imposed, noting: “Since our legal orders and law are entirely created within our
own cultures, it can be difficult to see and understand law in other cultures. In
other words, law is societally bound – it is only law within the society that
created it.” Val Napolean, Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders, in
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 229, 232 (René Provost
& Colleen Sheppard eds., 2013).
63. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 195 (2011).
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national and international norms. The argument follows that
right and wrong, in the context of human rights, is independent
of written laws and should apply uniformly to all people
regardless of culture or treaty signatories.
The current regime of human rights law is enforced through
the United Nations in a system overseen by the creation of a
committee for each treaty,64 as well as through the UN Council
on Human Rights.65 The problem is particularly clear when
observing the UN Council on Human Rights. The Council,
previously known as the Commission, was run by some of “the
worst human rights violators, including Libya, Saudi Arabia,
and Sudan.”66 These developing countries found a way to use the
human rights framework to push their internal agenda and gain
power. Posner says, “The human rights violators formed
alliances with each other, and with other countries that cared
more about diplomatic or strategic cooperation than about
human rights.”67 If this is the case at the Council and at treatyspecific committees, then the BHR treaty is an opportunity for
developing countries to gain power in world politics.
Furthermore, while these committees lend power and legitimacy
to the participant states, they are so underfunded and underrespected that they are not given the power needed to actually
enforce a treaty.
G. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In order for the proposed BHR treaty to come into effect it
will need the support of a diverse group of states, all with
competing interests.68 This will cause the eventual treaty to be
narrow in scope and weak in its ability to protect human rights
and hold corporations accountable. One of the most vehement
opponents to a legally binding instrument is John Ruggie,
drafter of the UNGP and former Special Representative to the
Secretary General on Business and Human Rights. He warns,
“[B]usiness and human rights is not so discrete an issue area as
64. Posner, supra note 42, at 40.
65. Id. at 43.
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id.
68. Aaron Rhodes, The False Promise of an International Business and
Human Rights Treaty, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2014, 6:27 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-rhodes/the-false-promise-of-ani_b_5575236.html.
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to lend itself to a single set of detailed treaty obligations,” and
that it was “hard to imagine [such a treaty] providing a basis for
meaningful legal action.”69 In sum, his fear is that a treaty would
be nothing more than “largely symbolic gestures, of little
practical use to real people in real places . . . From the vantage
point of victims, an all-encompassing business and human rights
treaty . . . is a profound deception.”70
This has been the case with past human rights treaties. The
language used is crafted in such a way that the obligations are
vague and conflicting, or, in some cases, too demanding to be
realistic.71 Narrow language creates a binding treaty but it does
not actually force any action among ratifying states and is
therefore difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.
Additionally, any language broad enough to get through the
UN committees will then be subject to construal by individual
states. States will have the autonomy and authority to interpret
syntax on favorable terms. For example, by taking leeway with
ambiguous words such as “reasonable” or “fair” in the ICESCR.72
To make a treaty even more impotent, countries can ratify it
along with a reservation or understanding. This means a state
could ratify a BHR treaty so far as it supports the values of a
domestic law or constitutional framework.73 Effectively, such
reservations would make no new commitments whatsoever.
H. OBFUSCATION
It is possible that the pro-treaty coalition is pressing for a
binding instrument just to confuse and clutter up the human
rights agenda: “[G]iven the tendency of abusive states to foster
meaningless global human rights legislation and institutions, it
can be assumed their support is part of a strategy of
obfuscation.”74 The fear is that the advocacy for a treaty will take
energy away from states making progress on the UNGP.75 While
over 600 organizations have put support behind the idea of the
UN progressing toward a binding treaty, at the time of Ecuador’s
proposal, only one country had passed a national action plan for
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Posner, supra note 42, at 31–32.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 37.
Rhodes, supra note 68.
Biron, supra note 58.
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compliance with the UNGP.76 Now, over three years later that
number has risen only to ten states.77 This redirection of civil
society energy could be a reprieve for states not willing to enforce
these standards.78
A BHR treaty is also many years off from going through the
UN committee review and ratification process. Even Ecuador, in
2014, estimated that any eventual vote on a BHR treaty is more
than a decade off.79 This stalling technique is comparable to the
negotiations surrounding the “Transnational Corporation Code
of Conduct,” which was abandoned after 22 years of dialogue.80
If the past is any indication of how this process might go, several
years will go by before a binding instrument is finally adopted.
This interim period could allow for states and non-state actors
to continue to violate human rights all while pointing to a lack
of consensus on accountability.
A further concern is with the hypertrophy of human rights.
If total energy directed at respecting and enforcing human rights
protections is zero sum, then for each new right or obligation,
less overall attention and resources can be paid to each. Posner
points out, “The number of human rights increased from 20 in
1975, to 100 in 1980, to 175 in 1990, to 300 today.”81 As the
number of rights increases, each right becomes marginalized
within the public conscience. “This is why human rights keep
proliferating and in this way render each other meaningless for
constraining behavior.”82 In theory, human rights are not
created; each person is born with the same set of rights as every

76. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, State national
action plans, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalAction
Plans.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
77. Those countries are Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. See National
Action Plans, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://businesshumanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-toolsexamples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/nationalaction-plans#examples (last visited September 6, 2016).
78. This criticism of the wayward support of the treaty also echoes similar
disparagement of the 2006 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.
79. John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business
and Human Rights Treaty, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. AND BUS. (July 8, 2014),
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/the-past-asprologue-a-moment-of-truth-for-un-business-and-human-rights-tre.
80. Id.
81. Posner, supra note 42, at 92.
82. Id. at 93.
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other member of humanity.83 However, in practice, governments
have a limited capacity to legislate, enforce, and litigate each
right. Therefore, as the vocabulary of human rights discourse
continues to expand, the normative independence of each right
must shrink.84
As a very broad example, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) entered into force in 1976
and provides for equal treatment of women (Article 3);
prevention of torture (Article 7); and protection of children
(Article 24).85 In the years following its adoption, the UN
endorsed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
(1984), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).86
These treaties may take a complimentary approach rather than
being in opposition to one another. However, the need for
additional protections after the passage of the ICCPR forces one
to wonder about the effectiveness of that document.
Unfortunately, though these treaties work toward the same
purpose, “[t]he more human rights there are, and thus the
greater the variety of human interests that are protected, the
more that the human rights system collapses into an
undifferentiated welfarism in which all interests must be taken
seriously for the sake of the public good.”87 Historically, it may
be that “recognizing” a new right might be simpler than
enforcing rights which are already understood.

83. This is why most human treaties “recognize” a right as opposed to
establishing or creating a right. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Nov. 29, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
84. GRET HALLER, HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?: RECONCILING
FREEDOM WITH EQUALITY, 147 (Cynthia Klohr trans., Berghahn Books 2012)
(2012).
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
86. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
87. Posner, supra note 42, at 94.
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I. BLAME SHIFTING

Multi-national corporations often balk at doing business in
states with poor human rights records. Some MNCs may have
chosen not to incorporate in or do extensive business dealings
with certain states based on their negative treatment by civil
society organizations. This can be due to official international
sanctions, or it can be the effect of progressive corporate
citizenship. Foreign direct investment is absolutely crucial for
the success of many developing states; they are thus encouraged
to increase their human rights protections. However, shifting
the responsibility to protect from states to corporations could
make the state appear better without making any positive
difference in the human rights sector. If the human rights
watchdogs no longer were so scathing of these developing
countries, perhaps it would encourage more FDI.88 This
proposition is consistent with data showing that when a
developing country signals it will improve its human rights
record, outside investment increases.89 This also might mean
that backing a treaty could be as productive as signing the treaty
itself.
Ruggie has also expressed fears that shifting the blame from
countries to corporations undermines development.90 An added
benefit for these states is that by shifting the responsibility, it is
possible they would be subject to fewer sanctions.91 Currently,
the international community sanctions states for unacceptable
behaviors. A binding legal treaty could cause some of those
sanctions to be lifted. In sum, shifting responsibility to
businesses allows states to avoid the responsibility to protect
human rights.92 If this were the case, it explains why such
nations would so adamantly support this treaty: it would turn
the gaze from the Western NGOs to MNCs operating within
their borders.

88. Jerbi, supra note 48, at 543.
89. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 2012.
90. Jerbi, supra note 48, at 307.
91. Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 543 (2001).
92. Jerbi, supra note 48, at 302.
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CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the issues surrounding a BHR treaty are
complex and may, measured by some, even be underhanded.
This Article does not take the Kantian approach that for a treaty
to be morally good, it must be supported for moral reasons;
rather, there is the possibility that a good thing done for the
wrong reasons can still lead to positive outcomes.93 However, the
international community should proceed cautiously to prevent
the human rights movement from becoming political rhetoric
and a tool to the detriment of human rights. Simply by
supporting the treaty process, states have the opportunity
improve their human rights records at face value, encouraging
investment. Additionally, proponents may be supportive of a
possible binding instrument in the future to distract from their
behavior in the present. This reprieve might pay off for malactors regardless of whether the treaty is eventually passed. If
the treaty fails, the current non-binding instruments will have
been diluted. If the treaty passes, however, it shifts
responsibility from states and emboldens domestic corporations.
Adversaries of the binding instrument negotiations take
issue with the likelihood of a treaty finding consensus and with
the eventual effectiveness that document would have. They
make the argument that valuable time will be lost in
negotiations; while the UN debates the exact treaty parameters,
states can use this lack of consensus as a reason to not act to
protect human rights. Because of the binding nature of any
treaty, many of the obligations most needed to protect human
rights will be left out, losing the comprehensive nature of the
UNGP. The UNGP is voluntary, a choice that creates cohesion
rather than derision resulting from forced compliance.94
It is clear that there is still much to be done to adequately
protect all person from human rights abuses by corporations and
countries alike. Human rights treaties have much room to grow,
and one way would be through a Business and Human Rights
treaty. Even for self-interested developing countries, such a
treaty would benefit both country and citizen. Conversely,
93. MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 111
(2009).
94. Although the “voluntary” nature of the UNGP applies to states wishing
to adopt its principles and create national action plans to hold corporations
accountable, it does not mean human rights are optional for multinational
corporations.
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although Western democracies have good reasons for
disapproving of the treaty process, it may fail without any of
their guidance, input, and support.95 Both sides must find
common ground upon which to develop a long-term agreement
that could eventually be converted into a binding legal
instrument.96

95. In 2015, the European Parliament convened an Intergovernmental
Working Group to discuss creation of a business and human rights treaty.
Despite its importance, only 9 of 28 member states attended. See ECCJ
Intervention at EU Parliament Event on the UN Treaty on Business and Human
Rights, EUR. COAL. FOR CORP. JUST. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://corporatejustice.org
/news/166-eccj-intervention-at-eu-parliament-event-on-the-un-treaty-onbusiness-and-human-rights.
96. John Ruggie, in a presentation to University College London on
February 25, 2015, suggested the BHR treaty, along with the UNGP, could be
used as a precision instrument to target specific human rights abuses. See John
Ruggie, Embedding Global Markets: Lessons from Business & Human Rights,
Presentation at CEL Annual Lecture Centre for Ethics and Law University
College London (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/law-ethics/
events/docs/annual-lecture-2015.

